Frank Manwill v. Ernest Oyler and Leta Oyler : Brief of Defendants and Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
Frank Manwill v. Ernest Oyler and Leta Oyler :
Brief of Defendants and Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Olsen and Chamberlain; Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Manwill v. Oyler, No. 9346 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3808
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
__ ___.._,:· \ l E D 
r - -1960 
FRAN!{ MANWILL, 
Plain.tiff and Respond-ent·;---
-vs.-
ERNEST OYLER and 
LETA OYLER, 
Case 
No. 9346 
Defendants and .Appella;nts. 
BRIEF Q~F DEFENDANTS 
AND AP·P·ELLANT'S 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
.Attorn.eys for Defendarnts 
arnd .Appellants 
Richfield, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....... ------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS.................................................................. 2 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I: 
THE BRINGING OF PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS 
LIMITED TO FOUR YEARS WHICH COMMENCED 
TO RUN IMMEDIATELY UPON CONFERRING OF 
ANY BENEFIT AND THE PERIOD COULD NOT 
BE EXTENDED BY AN ORAL AGREEMENT OR 
PROMISE ----------------------------------------------------·-···························--------· 
CONCLUSION 
Statutes Cited 
3 
6 
78-12-25 DCA 1953.................................................................................... 3 
78-12-44 DCA 1953 .................................................................................... 3, 4, 5 
Texts Cited 
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 4, Page 494.......................................... 3 
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 34, P. 117, 93, Limitations of 
Actions, Section 145, 113.................................................................. 3 
American Law Reports, Vol. 135, P. 433, Anno. -"Statutory 
req:uirell?-~nt that ,new promise or acknowledgement must 
be m writing, etc. ............................................................................ 5 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 54, Page 106, Limitations 
of Actions, Sec. 160............................................................................ 3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANE: MANWILL, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
~vs.-
ERNEST OYLER and \ 
LETA OYLER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 9346 
BRIEF O,F DEFENDANTS 
AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 23, 1960, Plaintiff commenced this action 1 
alleging that in the years 1950 through 1953 he paid on 
behalf of Defendants to a third party $5,506.20 (R. 1, 
Par. 2 Original Complaint; R. 5, Par. 1 Amended Com-
plaint); that in the year 1954 he transferred to Defend-
ants a grazing permit worth $1,800.00 and cattle worth 
$3,000.00 (R. 1 and 2). He alleged no acts, transactions, 
1 An Original and an Amended Complaint appear in the files. 
The only effect of the amendment was to allege that the oral agreement 
Plaintiff relies upon was consummated in 1957 instead of, as originally 
pleaded, 1956. The remainder of the allegations of the Original Com-
plaint were unchanged (R. 1-3, 5, 6). 
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or events occurring after the year 1954, except for an 
oral agreement by which, he contended, the Defendants in 
1957 undertook to "repay" to Plaintiff the sums and 
values advanced in 1950 through 1954. (R. 1, Par. 1; 
Amended Complaint R. 5, Lines 15 and 16.) 
The Complaint asks for the amounts paid on behalf 
of and the values of the property transferred to the De-
fendants in 1950-1954, quite significantly demanding in-
terest from the date of each individual transfer or pay-
ment (R. 3, Lines 2-5, 7-9, 12-14), rather than from the 
date of the alleged oral agreement in 1957. 
The Defendants fundamentally contend that no pay-
ments were ever made for, or benefits conferred upon 
them by the Plaintiff; but upon the face of the Complaint 
moved to dismiss on the ground that it failed to state 
a cause of action and that the action pleaded was barred 
hy the Statute of Limitations. (R. 4) By stipulation the 
motion went to both the Original and Amended Com-
plaints (R. 6). 
The Defendants' :Motion was denied (R. 7-8) and this 
Interlocutory Appeal was sought. 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
PmxT I. 
TI-IE BRINGING OF PLAINTIFF'S ACTION 
WAS LIMITED TO FOUR YEARS WHICH 
C01\IMENCED TO RUN I:Ml\£EDIATELY 
UPON CONFERRING OF _ANY BENEFIT AND 
TfiE PERIOD COULD NOT BE EXTENDED 
BY AN ORAL AGREEl\IENT OR PROMISE. 
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ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE BRINGING OF PLAINTIFF'S ACTION 
WAS Lil\fiTED TO FOUR YEARS WHICH 
C01IlVIENCED TO RUN IMMEDIATELY 
UPON CONFERRING OF ANY BENEFIT AND 
THE PERIOD COULD NOT BE EXTENDED 
BY AN ORAL AGREEMENT OR PROMISE. 
The Complaint alleges that from 1950 through 1953 
the Plaintiff paid money for and on behalf of, and in the 
year 1954 transferred property to, the Defendants. This, 
if it in fact occurred, gave rise to a cause of action in favor 
of the Plaintiff upon the theory of assumpsit. (Am. Jur. 
Vol. 4, Page 494). The Statute of Limitations for such 
an action commences to run at the time Plaintiff makes 
any payment for or confers any benefit upon the Defend-
ant since he may immediately commence an action 
thereon. (54 C. J. S. P. 106, Limitations of Actions Sec. 
160; Vol. 34 Am. Jur. Page 117, 93, Limitations of Ac-
tions, Sees. 145, 113.) 
The Plaintiff's claim falls within the residium statute 
of Utah's Limitations on Actions, Section 78-12-25, UCA 
1953, and any cause of action for payment of money by the 
Plaintiff on behalf of the Defendants, became barred as to 
the latest payment by the Plaintiff in the year 1957. The 
transferring of property by the Plaintiff to the Defend-
ants in the year 1954 became barred in the year 1958. 
Section 78-12-44 UCA 1953 reads as follows: 
''In any case founded on contract, \vhen any 
part of the principal or interest shall have been 
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paid, or an acknowledgement of an existing liabil-
ity, debt, or claim, or any promise to pay the 
same, shall have -been made, an action may be 
brought within the period prescribed for the same 
after such payment, acknowledgement, or promise; 
but such acknowledgement or promise must be in 
writin.g signed by the party to be charged thereby. 
****" 
The theory of the Plaintiff is that some cause of 
action arose in 1950-1954; otherwise he would not have 
demanded interest in each particular instance from the 
date the initial transaction occurred. His complaint 
asserts, in employing the word ''repay,'' that he is suing 
to recover on the original transaction rather than the 
oral agreement the latter of which, in any conceivable 
event, is nevertheless based upon the original transac-
tions in 1950-1954. 
This situation clearly falls within Section 78-12-44 
because the theory of the Plaintiff must be that the alleged 
agreement of 1957 was either, in the words of 78-12-44, 
an "acknowledgement of an existing liability" or a 
''promise to pay the same.'' 
The last count of Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 2, Par. 4) 
is to the effect that: 
"That it was understood * * * that Plaintiff 
would retain certain interest in the farm property 
* * * un.til said obligalions were paid in full; that 
no written agreement to that effect was entered 
into at any time, but that such understanding has ·? 
been had by the parties. That based on such 
agreement and such understanding of the parties, 
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and on the allegations of this complaint, Plaintiff 
has an equitable lien against the real property and 
the personal property of Defendants located in 
vVayne County, State of Utah, to secure the pay-
ment of the obligations referred to herein.'' 
The Plaintiff cannot rely upon the theory that the 
events of 1957 resulted in a new enforceable agreement 
since there was no consideration in support of the same. 
Of conclusive importance is the fact that there was 
no contemporaneous consideration for the alleged prom-
ise or agreement of 1957. A number of cases have QOn-
sidered a subsequent oral contract to pay an obligation 
otherwise barred by statute and the majority hold that 
where the new promise or agreement is supported by 
contemporaneous, independent consideration a writing 
is not required notwithstanding the existence in the jur-
isdiction of a statute comparable to our 78-12-44. 
There have been collected in an annotation in 135 
..:\LR beginning at Page 433 a number of such cases but 
in each there has been an independent and contempora-
neous consideration sufficient to support a contract. The 
editor's note on Page 434 under Sub-Section II states 
that there are a respectable number of cases adopting the 
view that a writing is necessa.ry even though contempora-
neous consideration exists and in those cases holding no 
writing to be necessary there has uniformly been required 
a sufficient contemporaneous consideration and in the lan-
guage of the author: 
"not the mere moral obligation to pay the barred 
debt, but a new contemporaneous consideration, 
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executory or executed, sufficient to create a mu-
tually binding contract between the promisor and 
the promisee.'' 
The Plaintiff acknowledged in the lower court and 
asserted before this Court in his brief opposing the 
Petition for Intermediate Appeal that the consideration 
upon which he is relying is in his own words "past con-
sideration'' but nevertheless ''sufficient to support the 
agreement alleged to have been entered into in 1957." (P. 
4, Paragraph 4, Plaintiff's Answer to Petition for Inter-
mediate Appeal.) 
The entire tenor of the Plaintiff's pleadings and his 
brief opposing the Intermediate Appeal establishes that 
there was no consideration at the time of, or in any way 
supporting, the alleged agreement of 1957. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that no valid, sufficient, or 
enforceable agreement was entered into in 1957 effective 
to revive the action of the Plaintiff theretofore barred by 
the Statute of Limitations and that the trial court's 
order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorn,eys for Defendants 
and A pp·ellants 
Richfield, Utah 
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